Ok another float plane down. I know, no new causes for accidents but this rash of carnage is getting pretty extreme. Ironically at least two of the accidents had experienced pilots but the unknown is their flying history. I guess the outstanding question is why, and that will likely never be answered. I certainly hope this is an anomaly and not a trend.
Then there is the guy who wants to fly his buck 80 across the north Atlantic. He had no clue to what mother nature can dish out and the terrain he has to deal with. Greenland has mountains and ice caps that are close to ten thousand feet and Nuuk can go from calm winds to over a hundred knots far faster than the time for the crossing and landing on the east coast of Greenland is dicey at the best of times. I have had chats with Greenland Air fling wing pilots and the stupid people they had to rescue (if they survived) Why do general aviation types do such crazy adventures. - damn!!
Dropping like flies
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Chuck Ellsworth
WTF is going on?
Has light aircraft flying increased that much or just the accidents?
Has light aircraft flying increased that much or just the accidents?
-
Colonel
- Posts: 3450
- Joined: Wed Apr 29, 2015 10:31 am
Historically, accidents are 90% pilot error, 10% mechanical.
The 90% pilot error is pretty straightforward: the pilot made a bad choice
and attempted to do something beyond his, or his aircraft's, capabilities
and came up short.
The other 10% is where the aircraft had a problem. Now, there is a broad
spectrum here. IMHO 99% of this 10% could be dealt with successfully by
a skilled pilot who knew what the problem really was, which can be really
hard to figure out in real time. The other 1% is when something happens -
say, a wing falls off - and it doesn't matter how good a pilot you are, there
is no way out. You are going to die today, and that's all there is. However,
this is a pretty small percentage of mechanical problems.
Knowledge and skill helps a pilot with that 90% above. His knowledge should
help him make good decisions, and his skill should haul his ass out of trouble
when he doesn't. A bit of luck helps, too - see Ernie Gann:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fate_Is_the_Hunter
Read that book.
What confuses people is when high-time pilots - known for their knowledge and
skill - crash. Could be mechanical - see Andrew Wright, or Steve Whittman - but
it could also be pilot error.
Now, you ask me, how did an experienced and skilled pilot fall victim to pilot error?
I have a story for you. In 1992 GM had a fleet of cars without ABS, and in 1993 GM
put ABS on the fleet. You could hear the statisticians ejaculating. It was a huge sample
size, and it was going to prove that ABS braking improved safety.
Except, it didn't. The 1993 fleet with ABS had the same accident rate as the 1992 fleet
without ABS. Impossible, the actuaries wailed. But what they found, is the people drove
faster into the corners, and incorporated ABS into their driving. They operated at the same
level of risk.
And, that's the thing about high-time pilots. Some of them routinely, constantly operate at
extremely high levels of risk, that would quickly kill a low-time pilot and send a sane person
screaming from the room.
See "normalization of deviance", below. Be aware of the danger it poses.
A good example of this is Scott Crossfield. First guy to fly Mach 2. Flew the X-15. A very
skilled and knowledgeable pilot. You know how he died? In a fucking Cessna 210, dicing
with thunderstorms in the southeast. He operated at a very high level of risk, and it caught
up with him.
Do you have any idea of how many of my friends, extremely skilled and knowledgeable and
experienced and qualified pilots, have died when they regularly took on extreme levels of risk?
I know. Compared to a Canadian, I am stupid and a shitty pilot. I don't know anything about
aviation, and I have no virtue to signal. Got it.
[quote]Normalization of deviance is a term first coined by sociologist Diane Vaughan when reviewing the Challenger disaster. Vaughan noted that the root cause of the Challenger disaster was related to the repeated choice of NASA officials to fly the space shuttle despite a dangerous design flaw with the O-rings.
Vaughan describes this phenomenon as occurring when people within an organization become so insensitive to deviant practice that it no longer feels wrong. Insensitivity occurs insidiously and sometimes over years because disaster does not happen until other critical factors line up.[/quote]
Now, NASA was not some small, hillbilly organization operating in Africa without the "benefit"
of onerous government oversight. That's these guys:
The 90% pilot error is pretty straightforward: the pilot made a bad choice
and attempted to do something beyond his, or his aircraft's, capabilities
and came up short.
The other 10% is where the aircraft had a problem. Now, there is a broad
spectrum here. IMHO 99% of this 10% could be dealt with successfully by
a skilled pilot who knew what the problem really was, which can be really
hard to figure out in real time. The other 1% is when something happens -
say, a wing falls off - and it doesn't matter how good a pilot you are, there
is no way out. You are going to die today, and that's all there is. However,
this is a pretty small percentage of mechanical problems.
Knowledge and skill helps a pilot with that 90% above. His knowledge should
help him make good decisions, and his skill should haul his ass out of trouble
when he doesn't. A bit of luck helps, too - see Ernie Gann:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fate_Is_the_Hunter
Read that book.
What confuses people is when high-time pilots - known for their knowledge and
skill - crash. Could be mechanical - see Andrew Wright, or Steve Whittman - but
it could also be pilot error.
Now, you ask me, how did an experienced and skilled pilot fall victim to pilot error?
I have a story for you. In 1992 GM had a fleet of cars without ABS, and in 1993 GM
put ABS on the fleet. You could hear the statisticians ejaculating. It was a huge sample
size, and it was going to prove that ABS braking improved safety.
Except, it didn't. The 1993 fleet with ABS had the same accident rate as the 1992 fleet
without ABS. Impossible, the actuaries wailed. But what they found, is the people drove
faster into the corners, and incorporated ABS into their driving. They operated at the same
level of risk.
And, that's the thing about high-time pilots. Some of them routinely, constantly operate at
extremely high levels of risk, that would quickly kill a low-time pilot and send a sane person
screaming from the room.
See "normalization of deviance", below. Be aware of the danger it poses.
A good example of this is Scott Crossfield. First guy to fly Mach 2. Flew the X-15. A very
skilled and knowledgeable pilot. You know how he died? In a fucking Cessna 210, dicing
with thunderstorms in the southeast. He operated at a very high level of risk, and it caught
up with him.
Do you have any idea of how many of my friends, extremely skilled and knowledgeable and
experienced and qualified pilots, have died when they regularly took on extreme levels of risk?
I know. Compared to a Canadian, I am stupid and a shitty pilot. I don't know anything about
aviation, and I have no virtue to signal. Got it.
[quote]Normalization of deviance is a term first coined by sociologist Diane Vaughan when reviewing the Challenger disaster. Vaughan noted that the root cause of the Challenger disaster was related to the repeated choice of NASA officials to fly the space shuttle despite a dangerous design flaw with the O-rings.
Vaughan describes this phenomenon as occurring when people within an organization become so insensitive to deviant practice that it no longer feels wrong. Insensitivity occurs insidiously and sometimes over years because disaster does not happen until other critical factors line up.[/quote]
Now, NASA was not some small, hillbilly organization operating in Africa without the "benefit"
of onerous government oversight. That's these guys:
-
Eric Janson
- Posts: 412
- Joined: Tue Jul 14, 2015 10:31 am
Here's some crazy Russians or Ukrainians in am AN-12.
AN-12 is a C-130 sized aircraft. At one point so can see the spray from the waves on the windshield.
Here's a good documentary about the Challenger
Nobody went to prison over this - no real accountability. They learned nothing and lost the Columbia as a result.
And there's still nobody in prison.
AN-12 is a C-130 sized aircraft. At one point so can see the spray from the waves on the windshield.
Here's a good documentary about the Challenger
Nobody went to prison over this - no real accountability. They learned nothing and lost the Columbia as a result.
And there's still nobody in prison.
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Liquid Charlie
- Posts: 524
- Joined: Sun Aug 23, 2015 1:34 pm
All good stuff and certainly all these accidents are caused by the wrong decision being made or lack of making the proper choice.
I can relate this to the Max. Certainly Boeing produced a flawed product but I find it ironic that the accidents happened where they did. I'm sure the issue was dealt with successfully in parts of the world which had more experienced and better trained crews. Airbus also went through similar accidents but I guess between news media and social media of today we see the resulting witch hunt. Certainly Boeing should share the blame but not all all of it.
Today there is such a preoccupation with rules. I have seen people so caught up on "it's legal" they are actually creating a more dangerous situation.
One often wonders why pilots make some of the decisions they do. Good example where a twin otter captain chose to do the in to circle off an ILS because of about 15 kt downwind landing and hit a hill and killed about 9 people. a DC3 had just landed successfully downwind off the ILS. What was he thinking?
WX minimums, I admit I broke them often. Broughton Island - about 2000 below published minimums and this was in the days before GPS. The catch phrase of the time was published minimums were based on the poorest pilot on his worst day. Because published minimums were so high we set our own based on local knowledge and familiarity with airports visited everyday. Many of the published approaches were useless so yes we brewed our own. Pretty shocking stuff based on today's mindset. Damn we were bad >:D
I can relate this to the Max. Certainly Boeing produced a flawed product but I find it ironic that the accidents happened where they did. I'm sure the issue was dealt with successfully in parts of the world which had more experienced and better trained crews. Airbus also went through similar accidents but I guess between news media and social media of today we see the resulting witch hunt. Certainly Boeing should share the blame but not all all of it.
Today there is such a preoccupation with rules. I have seen people so caught up on "it's legal" they are actually creating a more dangerous situation.
One often wonders why pilots make some of the decisions they do. Good example where a twin otter captain chose to do the in to circle off an ILS because of about 15 kt downwind landing and hit a hill and killed about 9 people. a DC3 had just landed successfully downwind off the ILS. What was he thinking?
WX minimums, I admit I broke them often. Broughton Island - about 2000 below published minimums and this was in the days before GPS. The catch phrase of the time was published minimums were based on the poorest pilot on his worst day. Because published minimums were so high we set our own based on local knowledge and familiarity with airports visited everyday. Many of the published approaches were useless so yes we brewed our own. Pretty shocking stuff based on today's mindset. Damn we were bad >:D
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Colonel
- Posts: 3450
- Joined: Wed Apr 29, 2015 10:31 am
re: Max imperfections
I don’t understand this lack of memory and this
prima donna sense of entitlement, that moron
pilots think that the manufacturer and maintenance
will ALWAYS deliver a perfect airplane to the ramp.
Hahahahahaahahahahaahhaahahhaa
Does no one remember the 707 Dutch roll?
Or the 737 rudder reversal? Lost to collective
memory because it happened more than 6 months
ago, I guess.
It’s the fucking job of the pilot to deal with it.
That’s why he’s there. Last line of defense.
Anyone that needs this explained to them is
too stupid to be a pilot, and that’s really saying
something.
I don’t understand this lack of memory and this
prima donna sense of entitlement, that moron
pilots think that the manufacturer and maintenance
will ALWAYS deliver a perfect airplane to the ramp.
Hahahahahaahahahahaahhaahahhaa
Does no one remember the 707 Dutch roll?
Or the 737 rudder reversal? Lost to collective
memory because it happened more than 6 months
ago, I guess.
It’s the fucking job of the pilot to deal with it.
That’s why he’s there. Last line of defense.
Anyone that needs this explained to them is
too stupid to be a pilot, and that’s really saying
something.
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Slick Goodlin
- Posts: 721
- Joined: Thu Jun 11, 2015 6:46 pm
[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=9907.msg28462#msg28462 date=1565195447]
It’s the fucking job of the pilot to deal with it.
[/quote]
That shouldn’t let everyone else off the hook, should it?
It’s the fucking job of the pilot to deal with it.
[/quote]
That shouldn’t let everyone else off the hook, should it?
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Colonel
- Posts: 3450
- Joined: Wed Apr 29, 2015 10:31 am
No, but the job of a pilot is to play goalie, and catch
what slips by everyone else.
I have this notion that if someone feels they should
get paid over a third of a million US dollars each year
for a few days work each month, they should be
pretty fucking good at it.
what slips by everyone else.
I have this notion that if someone feels they should
get paid over a third of a million US dollars each year
for a few days work each month, they should be
pretty fucking good at it.
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