If You're Still Hauling Ass, Halfway Down the Runway ...

[pdw]

The comparison with the "San Fran 777"(COL) is useful IMO:
A "new"(Trey) 777 pilot is tricked into trouble where also a neg-pos-neg component-variance taking place.
Pilots realize the slowing too late, mainly via 'auto-throttle misunderstanding' (report),  where goaround became ineveitable anyway but was missed til too late (was so "high" at first then everything's still looking good ahead/VFR once lower) where anyway needed to be slower because already getting too close for developing high groundspeed situation (this inadvertant [i]SLOWING[/i] accident then partly being a product of that under the clear skies & VFR appoach restriction of the day ... [i]which to some extent could be the distraction[/i]).

Here in a rainy LGA approach to 210T the groundspeed starts out low at 121kts at 1400' and speeds up to 138kts by 500'. The excess shortens time for inadvertantly extending touchdown-point .. also into the 'reverse delay' trap ("hydroplaning" etc). Gets late for goaround, perhaps looks OK to proceed to land before late-rising/high groundspeed fully focused (ie: Not revealed as quick as it transpires ?), despite 'maintaining' at usual/routine airspeed over MAP and threshold correctly.

EDIT:
(in response to the next post)

KLGA passengers reported a bumpy appoach before event 7:41pm Oct27/2016. JFK is 9 miles southeast at 13-15degC / SE at 25kts (wx hist).

LO on 12degC-Lake Ontario 220nm NW/NNW; its trough looks like drawing warmer EAST COMPONENT off 17degC water around Long Island (strongest is one station on N/E side-of Long Island, E 28kts.

HI is located NNE; surface component on north side of LGA airport is ENE 5kts / 6-8degC. Then makes sense why it was very 'increasing negative' towards MAP/warmer ("10010G15kts"/Flushing NY .. nearest surface record 10min after)  :-\

[Big Ears Teddy]

Lard tunderin' jaysus, give me a break.  >:(

[TundraTire]

[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=4717.msg12235#msg12235 date=1477983654]
[quote]I guarantee you, once reverse has been [u]selected[/u], I am committed to [s]landing[/s] crashing[/quote]

at 132 knots with 2300 feet remaining, you surely are.

You guys keep bouncing all over the place.  I thought
the theory was that reverse thrust had been selected
[i]but not actuated[/i], which is supported by the fact that
virtually no speed had been lost from Vref at 250 AGL,
to 4600 feet down the runway.

So, your concern is that a thrust reverser which had
not been actuated, might not de-actuate?[/quote]


If you'd like the exact verbiage, here you go:


"WARNING: Do not attempt to go-around after initiating Engine Reverse as the Reversers may not fully stow and lock."


It's not possible to "select" reverse, without "actuating" or "initiating" reverse.


Are you, Strega, and Liquid Charlie still convinced that you should go-around after touching down and initiating reverse thrust?

[Colonel]

So.  You're at Vref with 2300 feet remaining.  A
crash is certain if you attempt to continue the
landing.

Your choice is to push a bad approach into a
certain crash, or go around.

[quote]the Reversers may not fully stow and lock[/quote]

Assuming this guy had reversers out - which
is total bullshit, he hadn't lost any speed -
he now has a choice - to certainly crash, OR
to go around and maybe have a problem with
reversers [i]which didn't actuate[/i].

Faced with a certain crash, is going around
with the reversers [u]not actuated[/u] really that
bad a choice?

See, the difference between you and I, is
that when I am facing a certain crash, the
paper and the rules go totally out the window,
and I will do whatever I have to do, to not crash.

I understand this makes me a [b]VERY BAD PERSON[/b],
and that's ok.  You and I live on very different
planets, where your overriding objective is regulatory
compliance, and mine is safety.

The irony - which you are certain to have difficulty
understanding - is that all your paperwork nonsense
was (ostensibly) created for the purpose of safety,
and here it is opposing safety.  Too funny.

[TundraTire]

Feel free to re-read your post on page 1 where you said a go around "is always an option".


Which I replied to with a possibility where it isn't.


And I prefaced my comment with several "Ifs" as it applies to the LGA crash.


Or don't. 


Who cares. 

[Colonel]

[quote]it isn't[/quote]

I understand very clearly that to you, damaging
the paperwork is far worse than crashing.  Tragic.

Reminds me.  Not sure how many jet type ratings
you have issued to pilots, but when I did it, I
took it very seriously, despite TC's demented
behaviour, which can somewhat jade one's
viewpoint towards their paperwork.

Regardless of what those fat fucks did, it is
interesting to reflect upon the pilots I issued
jet type ratings to.

The weakest was a retired Air Canada pilot.  20,000
hours in the logbook and a long list of type ratings,
and a real fondness for landing long and hot.  A
weak pilot.  I had a 500 hour PPL, for example, that
landed the jet with so much more skill and consistency.
He mastered the aircraft much, much faster than
the Air Canada pilot, whom I consider the most likely
pilot I issued a type rating to, to get into trouble.

Now, the four-bar position is that a Boeing is a real
fire-breathing dragon, a total handful to fly.  Gotta be
Chuck Yeager to fly one.  I will embrace your four-bar
rhetoric, regardless of how familiar and nauseating it is.

But I have to wonder.  Why did this 20,000 hour
Air Canada pilot struggle with such a simple stupid
fucking little jet?  Should have been child's play,
right out of the box for him, after all those decades
in fire-breathing Boeings.

[Colonel]

Anyone remember the Boeing that plugged up
the fuel system with ice (due to a design flaw)
and crashed at LHR a few years back?

The pilot was crucified and hung out to dry, I
might add.  He committed the terrible sin of
decreasing the flaps slightly on final, which
horror of horrors, wasn't anywhere in the paper.

After months of calculations, the accident board
grudgingly admitted that his unauthorized reduction
in flap on final after double engine failure allowed
the aircraft to clear the obstacles and likely saved
lives.

So, he brilliantly did the right thing under great
pressure and time constraints, but because it was
"against the book", he was villified.

What a great industry.

[Liquid Charlie]

I'm well aware of the restriction once reverse was selected. I wonder why they chose not to go around while they still could. My experience from interaction with american flight crews that they do not like "short" runways. The exception maybe the group from Alaska. The reaction by the majority was 6000 ft in a 72 was crazy, 5000' gravel in a 73 and a 72 was insane. Operation off "short" runways we were always ready for a goaround and stressed the fact that missing the target would generate a GA. Most 121 operators are not of that mind set. A GA is the most difficult exercise, especially in heavy metal. That is why there is a reluctance to do so and that is why people try and hang on and hope a long landing works out. You just need to look at the stats for rwy 25 in Ottawa. 8000 feet and numerous runway excursions and ironically most by american carriers. Some companies from USA would not dispatch to Ottawa because of the back course and company limitations that non precision runways were not acceptable.


Bottom line is this incident was likely a cultural thing. We sit here and judge and try and figure out why such a thing would ever happen. They simply missed the target, waited too long and got into the situation where they were just passengers hanging on. The biggest question to be answered in aviation. Why do crews make the choices they do. SOP's are a necessity but they do lend to a reduction in creative thinking and maybe stepping outside your comfort zone a little. Training and SOP's can't address all variables.


I had a 340 captain tell me that if Air France in YYZ had used autoland instead of manually trying to wrestle the aircraft onto the runway they likely would not have run off the end. Who knows if this is true but it is quite a statement of where aviation is going. 

[pdw]

[quote author=Liquid Charlie link=topic=4717.msg12264#msg12264 date=1478092451]I had a 340 captain tell me that if Air France in YYZ had used autoland instead of manually trying to wrestle the aircraft onto the runway they likely would not have run off the end. Who knows if this is true but it is quite a statement of where aviation is going.
[/quote]


There at YYZ ... in 30-50kts of decreased performance shear (tremendous power/groundspeed added) in late approach ... there's an interesting thought ... how the "autoland" would have fared:
A number of other aircraft (AF's i believe) had diverted to YHM and elsewhere already and these pilots chose to proceed among the Cells.  Ok if "autoland" commands the goaround on time, when necessary; but hard to imagine it's capable of any other magic when groundspeed got so high on wet rwy, unless somehow makes sooner/ more powerful deployment of reverse thrust ?

The EMAS proved itself a worthy tool here at LGA, where the goaround decision was not made (or not made in time).

[Slick Goodlin]

I have basically zero time with Otto doing the work, let alone landing, but my assumption is that auto land would just use my favourite short field technique: just klomp it on.  With wheels on the ground you can do such things as apply brakes, use reverse, and reduce speed below Vs, many of which are typically required to exit at the most convenient taxiway rather than through the lights and fence.

In any case, the person responsible for the airplane has to have a series of targets to meet and plans in place in case a target gets missed that they are willing to execute without hesitation.  Come to think of it, this *might* be one of those defining points of what a pilot has to do, regardless of type.

I do reserve the right to be wrong on this one.  Anyone care to set me straight on the machine's process and logic that it applies to an auto landing?