Scudrunners

A quick prelim run down on the 737 crack in S Korea.

*assumptions made ahead*
Assuming the pilots were dealing with engine issues, why on Gods name do you force a flying aircraft on the ground?

Did they think there was smoke in the cabin and they were on fire?
Why in God’s name did they not extend slats/flaps and gear?

Experience has taught me there are very few emergencies that require immediate reactionary inputs. And that pretty much is limited to helicopters and rotor emergencies.
Engine failure at high angle of attack in a multi engine aircraft requires input, but doesn’t need to be put back on the ground.

Think they secured the wrong one?

Guessing it was a go-around through a flock of birds, resulting in dual flameout/loss of thrust.

Or what Slick said.

My money isn’t on a dual loss of thrust.
Juan pointed out that the #2 is producing thrust also #1, as seen from one camera angle (heat distortion).

Further taking away from dual thrust loss, is the timeline: 7 minutes from go-around to impact.
Wayyyy too long for a glide/near to no-idle thrust. A sustained compressor stall(s) would tear apart the engine and both cowls are intact, well, slightly before they skidded 1/2 the length of the runway.

My thoughts: went around for birds. Caught several in the right engine (maybe both) fire warning in the right. Didn’t prioritize actions (think aviate, navigate, communicate); thought they needed to get on the ground ASAP and forgot the flaps/gear.
Pilot error as a result of xxxx failure.



I fully consume the Airbus Kool Aid. They have a fantastic philosophy and demonstrate it in their “Golden Rules.”
Rule number 1: aviate, navigate, communicate. Seems like a no brainer, but as an instructor over the last few years I seen many lose focus and miss steps in checklists, because they think they need to talk to someone.
Rule 2: use the appropriate level of automation. The autopilot is fairly robust and can take the workload off of you during an engine failure. Use it.
Rule 3: understand the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) at all times. Specific to Airbus, but the principle is the same. What input is the computer getting to fly the aircraft? I use this principle in my Cessna 180’s GFC500. Press a button, verify on the display.
Last, most important: Take actions things do go as expected.


I teach brand new pilots this and explain, once you understand this philosophy, (rules) you’ll never say “what is it doing now?”
With my 0 hours flown in a 737, I have no doubt the same rules apply to a guppy.
I fear the crew in S Korea didn’t subscribe to the same philosophy.

Chaos in the cockpit after right engine sucked some birds?

Compare with this guy, who probably has three times the flight time of both pilots combined of this 737:



It didn't exactly help the 737, after being forced onto the ground at 180 knots with the gear and flap up, that it hit a fucking concrete wall at the end of the runway. No EMAS, no frangible antennas like everywhere else.

Colonel wrote: Mon Dec 30, 2024 3:26 pm No EMAS, no frangible antennas like everywhere else.

That part actually has me wondering if I currently fly or can be sent to anywhere with similar threats. Does the company or union assess conformance to best practices in airport infrastructure? Probably not but I’ve been surprised before. Sounds like I have a project for the week.

20 years ago, I was the airport manager for a certified airport (CYSH) and weekly I would
get a phone call from Transport, asking my if I had installed 500 feet worth of EMAS at
each end of my 4000 foot runway - utilized almost completely by light single and twin
piston/prop aircraft - in order for me to remain in compliance with ICAO, which was more
important than anything else in the world, I was told.

This runway in Korea was 9,000 feet long which was great, but there is no way in hell
that a thick concrete wall supporting the localizer antenna directly at the end of the runway,
was ICAO compliant. And where was the EMAS?!

Also, notice the concrete wall all around the airport perimeter. Another disaster waiting to
happen, if they managed to slalom around the LOC antenna wall.

Remember when Air France decided to put an A340 down at Pearson (Cb's all around), too
fast halfway down one of the wet runways? They ran that mother down into the river and back
up again (1000 feet?) and let the pax out on the 400, without clearing customs. People driving
down the road picked them up and drove them back to Terminal 1.

Those are the same guys that after freezing up a pitot tube, held the stick all the way back
for 3.5 minutes on the edge of a stall, and killed everyone when they pancaked into the ocean.

Welcome to the 21st century, where the lesson is, if you're going to have shitty pilots, you'd
better make accommodations for that.

Col.

You forgot to mention the dickface FO at Atlas that crashed on the arrival in to IAH a few years back. Didn’t make the big news because it was mostly Amazon trinkets.

Killed everyone on board because he didn’t know how to fly.

Was fired from 2 previous jobs, and during training at Atlas threatened to go to HR using the race card because his evaluations weren’t up to par.



That crash is the Prime (r) example of what being woke will do for your bottom line.




https://abc13.com/plane-crash-ntsb-repo ... 7/6317054/

Quick update:
3 mins from declaring a mayday and go-around to crash.


What the hell were they thinking?

Absolutely nothing about the sequence of events leads me to believe there was competent crew at the controls.

Maybe they sucked birds into both engines.

Or maybe they shut down the left (good?) engine after the right engine barfed? This wouldn't exactly be the first time that happened.

They sure were in a big big hurry to get on the ground. No checklists were run - there was simply no time to do so. Even with all hydraulic and electrical systems failed (not sure I'm buying that), they could have still pulled the cables to drop the gear, but they chose not to. And they had no problem with a no-flap/no-slat configuration for landing, which is incredible. Again, even with all hydraulic systems failed, you can still run the flaps down with electrical, and blow the slats out with an accumulator on that type. There is amazing systems redundancy on that old school aircraft, if people bother to run the QRC.

None of that was done.

CVR and FDR will be interesting, if the data is not "accidentally" erased if it is found to be embarrassing. I see they’re already trying to blame Boeing, which is stupid. No one blamed Airbus when Sully sucked Canadian geese into both engines and went for a swim.

Sully, a 20th century pilot (F-4 and gliders if memory serves) had more flying skill in his left pinky than an entire herd of 21st century pilots.

Or Carlos Dardano, that I used to fly airshows with. He landed a Boeing after double engine failure on a levee so gently, no one was injured and they replaced the engines and flew it out and it continued service for decades afterwards. I remember riding with him in a shuttle from the hotel out to the airport to fly a show, and Carlos asked me, "You guys used to be the best in the world. What went wrong?" I had no answer for him.