[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=9098.msg25003#msg25003 date=1538400664]
Friends of mine - long retired from AC - had the Airbus foisted upon
them by Brian Mulroney, whom as sitting PM took a $500,000 cash
kickback per airframe from Airbus. Really. Look it up.
Anyways, I have been told by multiple sources that they learned to
pop circuit breakers at appropriate moments, to stop the Airbus from
doing really stupid things.
What a piece of euro-trash.
[/quote]
Those airframes are certainly of yesteryear. (and one is a lawn ornament in Halifax...) But I have no idea why you would pop a circuit breaker to continue to fly. It will make it worse. There are circuit breaker reset procedures, to uhhhh reset things. Perhaps that is what he was alluding too. (keep in mind the oldest airbus I've flown was manufactured in 2005)
As Eric said, the Airbus is a joy to fly. But like EVERY airplane, you have to know and understand it's capabilities before you can interject YOUR capabilities. Again, like Eric said, some people get wayyyyy behind trying to fix shitty autopilot inputs with more autopilot inputs.
The little red button on the side stick does magical things.
There are weird Airbus-ism's in which they have designed system logic to do things "better" than you as a pilot. A good example on the A320: speed brakes are commanded to half with the autopilot engaged. (when you select half or more). On the A319 and A321, you have full command of speed brakes with autopilot engaged. (no autopilot you have full on the 320).
Crosswind approaches are something to get used to as well.
AC Near crash SFO - NOTAMS are a bunch of Garbage and pilot fatigue
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I would like to see the actual notams and also if the delivery of "continuous, long term notams. I have been out of the international flying for a few years but did get caught once with arriving at an airport (Nome) where there was major construction going on and nothing in the notams I had retrieved. That is when I found out that these notams are not published in the daily notams but are found in the airport information in the Jepps (my approach charts) Of course my first reaction was WTF but that was(is) the system. For Air Canada this should not be a surprise since dispatch should have caught this as well (as well as the daily) We can point and call these guys dumb fucks but in my opinion the issue goes far deeper. If they are receiving their flight data as a package and not speaking directly to a dispatcher by definition air canada is a self dispatch system - I think not so why under a dispatch there were notams missed - no I have to think this all boils down to a double brain fart, they pulled it out but why did it happen, clearly something like this should never happen but it does. Slicing and dicing one crew will not fix it. Human factors rears it's ugly head again. Fixing it is the challenge, lynching is the problem. Blame someone, march them up against the wall, shoot them and make an example, move on and forget about it. Unfortunately that is the "herd" mentality and very little is learned from it. Nothing happened here so it will fade off into oblivion and Rice-a-Roni instead will be back in our minds instead of AC in SFO
[youtube][/youtube]
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[quote]I have no idea why you would pop a circuit breaker to continue to fly.[/quote]
Ok, here's an instance from 2014. Is that recent enough?
[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia ... TSC_report]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia ... TSC_report[/url]
[quote]Specifics in the report indicate that French First Officer Rémi Emmanuel Plesel was at the controls just before the stall warning sounded in the cockpit indicating that the jet had lost lift.
Investigators also found that, just moments earlier—on the fourth occurrence of the RTLU warning during the flight—the Captain chose to ignore the procedure advised by the ECAM instructions, and, instead, left his seat and [b]reset the circuit breaker of the entire FAC[/b], unintentionally disengaging multiple flight control systems, which would have to be turned on by the pilots after the circuit breakers are reset.
This circuit breaker is not on the list of circuit breakers that are allowed to be reset in flight, and disabling both FACs placed the aircraft in alternate law mode, disengaging the autopilot and stopping the automatic stall protection and bank angle protection.
The FAC is the part of the fly-by-wire system in A320 aircraft responsible for controlling flight surfaces including the rudder.
Without the FAC's computerized flight augmentation, [b]pilots would have to "rely on manual flying skills that are often stretched during a sudden airborne emergency".[/b]
When the crew was required to fly the Airbus A320 manually, there was an unexplained nine-second delay between the start of the roll and either pilot attempting to take control.
After nine seconds, the aircraft was banking at a 54° angle.[/quote]
Euro trash, that Brian Mulroney pocketed $500,000 in cash for each.
Ok, here's an instance from 2014. Is that recent enough?
[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia ... TSC_report]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia ... TSC_report[/url]
[quote]Specifics in the report indicate that French First Officer Rémi Emmanuel Plesel was at the controls just before the stall warning sounded in the cockpit indicating that the jet had lost lift.
Investigators also found that, just moments earlier—on the fourth occurrence of the RTLU warning during the flight—the Captain chose to ignore the procedure advised by the ECAM instructions, and, instead, left his seat and [b]reset the circuit breaker of the entire FAC[/b], unintentionally disengaging multiple flight control systems, which would have to be turned on by the pilots after the circuit breakers are reset.
This circuit breaker is not on the list of circuit breakers that are allowed to be reset in flight, and disabling both FACs placed the aircraft in alternate law mode, disengaging the autopilot and stopping the automatic stall protection and bank angle protection.
The FAC is the part of the fly-by-wire system in A320 aircraft responsible for controlling flight surfaces including the rudder.
Without the FAC's computerized flight augmentation, [b]pilots would have to "rely on manual flying skills that are often stretched during a sudden airborne emergency".[/b]
When the crew was required to fly the Airbus A320 manually, there was an unexplained nine-second delay between the start of the roll and either pilot attempting to take control.
After nine seconds, the aircraft was banking at a 54° angle.[/quote]
Euro trash, that Brian Mulroney pocketed $500,000 in cash for each.
Andy:
I got you hook, line and sinker...
I know that accident. The captain had the same FAC fault [u][i]ON THE GROUND[/i][/u] on trips prior. He watched the MX pull the breakers to reset it. (assuming the MX followed the Airbus procedure).
Monkey see, monkey do, except they're 33,000' and climbing to avoid a cell ahead.
It was the 3 or 4th time the ECAM tripped a FAC fault. The captain, having seen the MX reset a FAC [i][u][b]ON THE GROUND[/b][/u][/i] decided he'd pull a trick out of his hat. Against what Airbus says to do.
Now follow me here... By pulling the FAC's the aircraft no longer has the protections it is advertised to have. You have to fly it because as you saw, you lose autopilot. The rudder travel limiter was broken (which caused the FAC faults to begin with). Flying at M .78 or so, it (rudder) went full deflection, and that caused the rolling motion. They tried to correct with aileron, which didn't do much, and ultimately crashed the plane.
[u]They stopped flying a plane which was capable of flying. [/u]
I enjoy the human factors elements of accident investigations. They were also trying to get ahold of (Bangkok, Jakarta, I forget which????) Oceanic/center to get clearance to climb to avoid the cell ahead. The Captain said, climb anyway without clearance, or at least there was a lack of confidence in the clearance. At the same time the RTLU-> FAC fault kept popping up on the ECAM, distracting the captains attention.
El Capitaine, being a semi-god in Asia, decided to take matters in his own hands, and while out of his seat, his distracted FO stalled the aircraft and it started to roll.
I'd have to look in the book (too lazy at this moment) but I'm nearly positive, any circuit breakers we can reset (in flight), can be done from our respective seats (overhead). No need to go to the back CB panel. (behind the FO's seat)
I have pushed back and had to reset the FMGC's many times, which requires me to move my fat ass out of the seat, but again [u][i][b]ON THE GROUND![/b][/i][/u]
As for the NOTAMS: I haven't read the report, however did the AC crew acknowledge the NOTAMS for SFO 28's?
Down here: in the airline industry we don't self dispatch. Can't. It's a well orchastrated process where we often don't talk to each other and the flight is "dispatched" without issue. There are about a dozen things which would require an amended release (flight plan/wx/notams etc/...) In that case I would either call or ACARS dispatch for the amendment, time dictating that.
I got you hook, line and sinker...
I know that accident. The captain had the same FAC fault [u][i]ON THE GROUND[/i][/u] on trips prior. He watched the MX pull the breakers to reset it. (assuming the MX followed the Airbus procedure).
Monkey see, monkey do, except they're 33,000' and climbing to avoid a cell ahead.
It was the 3 or 4th time the ECAM tripped a FAC fault. The captain, having seen the MX reset a FAC [i][u][b]ON THE GROUND[/b][/u][/i] decided he'd pull a trick out of his hat. Against what Airbus says to do.
Now follow me here... By pulling the FAC's the aircraft no longer has the protections it is advertised to have. You have to fly it because as you saw, you lose autopilot. The rudder travel limiter was broken (which caused the FAC faults to begin with). Flying at M .78 or so, it (rudder) went full deflection, and that caused the rolling motion. They tried to correct with aileron, which didn't do much, and ultimately crashed the plane.
[u]They stopped flying a plane which was capable of flying. [/u]
I enjoy the human factors elements of accident investigations. They were also trying to get ahold of (Bangkok, Jakarta, I forget which????) Oceanic/center to get clearance to climb to avoid the cell ahead. The Captain said, climb anyway without clearance, or at least there was a lack of confidence in the clearance. At the same time the RTLU-> FAC fault kept popping up on the ECAM, distracting the captains attention.
El Capitaine, being a semi-god in Asia, decided to take matters in his own hands, and while out of his seat, his distracted FO stalled the aircraft and it started to roll.
I'd have to look in the book (too lazy at this moment) but I'm nearly positive, any circuit breakers we can reset (in flight), can be done from our respective seats (overhead). No need to go to the back CB panel. (behind the FO's seat)
I have pushed back and had to reset the FMGC's many times, which requires me to move my fat ass out of the seat, but again [u][i][b]ON THE GROUND![/b][/i][/u]
As for the NOTAMS: I haven't read the report, however did the AC crew acknowledge the NOTAMS for SFO 28's?
Down here: in the airline industry we don't self dispatch. Can't. It's a well orchastrated process where we often don't talk to each other and the flight is "dispatched" without issue. There are about a dozen things which would require an amended release (flight plan/wx/notams etc/...) In that case I would either call or ACARS dispatch for the amendment, time dictating that.
Be in “command†or be a victim of whomever is up front thinking they are in command? ;)
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[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=9098.msg25013#msg25013 date=1538410334]
I am glad I will never have to fly such a badly designed piece of trash.
[/quote]
Don't you have software in those?
I am glad I will never have to fly such a badly designed piece of trash.
[/quote]
Don't you have software in those?
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[quote]-> [size=4][b]DIAL IN THE LOC[/b][/size] <-[/quote]
Unfortunately the herc in alert was a vertical profile issue and not left to right. Likely no loc as well and unless BOXTOP was on no PAR either. They descended below their quadrant height - pure and simple.
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