Interesting Read: Rethinking the Briefing

[ScudRunner-d95]

[url=https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/re ... -briefing/]https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/re ... -briefing/[/url]


[color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][size=16px]On Aug. 14, 2013, an Airbus A300-600 freighter experienced a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) fatal accident during a localizer non-precision approach to Runway 18 at Birmingham (Alabama, U.S.) Shuttlesworth International Airport (“[/color][color=rgb(0, 174, 239)][url=https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/fa ... ectations/]False Expectations[/url][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)],” [i]ASW[/i], Feb. 2015). The National Transportation Safety Board ultimately concluded that pilot error, specifically “the flight crew’s continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft’s altitude during the approach,” was the probable cause of the crash, which killed both crewmembers and destroyed the airplane.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]The cockpit voice recorder revealed a haunting revelation about the content of the crew’s arrival briefing — it was perfect. Or was it? There was certainly a lot of talking by the pilot flying (PF) as he dutifully “ticked all the required boxes,” but no discussion regarding the relevant threats or countermeasures that could have averted disaster. The fatigued crew chose to fly a seldom performed, non-precision approach at night to a short runway with limited lighting; the weather forecast suggested an unpredictable cloud ceiling. This is one more example of an all-too-common thread in recent industry accidents: the loss of flight path and situational awareness due to onset of high crew workload as a result of rapidly changing conditions.[/size][/font][/color]
[color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]We have spoken to numerous U.S. and international air carriers about the content of their departure and arrival briefings and have found most to be strikingly similar. The commonality is a decades-old briefing method that has neither adapted to next generation flight decks nor incorporated breakthroughs in our understanding of human cognition. Today’s typical standard operating procedure (SOP) briefing is simply too long (due to years of adding more and more items determined to be ”too important not to discuss”). Additionally, briefings have become one-size-fits-all solutions serving as repositories for redundant [i]verbal[/i] crew crosschecks of highly automated, highly reliable systems. Finally,  too often they are one-sided conversations that lack involvement from the crewmember that recent industry accident trends indicate will play a primary role in maintaining safety margins: the pilot monitoring (PM).[/size][/font][/color]
[color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]After the Birmingham accident, Alaska Airlines reviewed its departure and arrival briefings and found they were equally inadequate. As a result, we decided to conduct a comprehensive study of our crew briefings that started with a review of our voluntary safety data (advanced qualification program, aviation safety action program, flight operational quality assurance, and line operations safety audit [LOSA]). We wanted to see if we could find a link between the content of our own lengthy, one-sided, “box checking” type briefing and the safety deficiencies noted in the data. What we found was astonishing. There was not only a clear connection between crew errors and undesired aircraft states with the quality and content of the briefings that preceded them, but also a disconnect between our SOP briefing requirements and line pilot adherence to those requirements. Our analysts advised us that we either had bad pilots or bad policy. We believed it was the latter. Our briefings, like so many in the aviation industry (as shown in the LOSA archive), had become so overloaded and were so often conducted by rote that many crews were either choosing not to adhere to the seemingly irrelevant policy or they dutifully followed it, only to find out later, through debriefing, that what they spent so much time briefing wasn’t focused on or directed toward what they [i]should have[/i] been briefing.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/size][size=26px][font=Roboto Slab]Briefing Better[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]It is time to rethink the way we brief — not only to address these issues but also to create a methodology that incorporates recent breakthroughs in cognitive theory regarding decision making in the very environments that are proving to be so challenging for pilots. After a year of research and development, we came up with four goals for our briefings:[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/font][/size][size=15px][i][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][b]Threat forward[/b]. Following the law of primacy (that information presented first is better retained), crew departure and arrival briefings should first address the relevant threats to the flight and go on to discuss specific countermeasures that could be employed should any of those threats degrade safety margins. An additional benefit of a threat-forward briefing is that in identifying relevant threats early in the briefing, those threats tend to positively inform the subsequent departure or arrival plan.
[/font][/color][/i][/size][/color][list][li][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][b]Interactive[/b]. The briefing design should encourage interaction between the PF and PM. It is time to put away the age-old notion of “my leg, your leg.” The desired goal should be an “our leg” mindset where the PM plays a leadership role in developing critical content of the briefing. After all, industry accident data continue to reveal that it is the PM who will play a significant role in noticing and re-establishing safety margins should they deteriorate.[/font][/color][/i][/size][/color][/li][/list][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][/color][/i][/size][/color][list][li][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][b]Scalable.[/b] Just as no two departures or arrivals are the same, neither should be the briefings that precede them. Yet on today’s modern flight decks, crews are required to go through the same litany of items for each flight leg. Crew briefings need to be scalable. Professional aviators know how to discern what is important based on proficiency, familiarity, flight complexity and a host of other factors that may or may not be relevant at the time[/font][/color][/i][/size][/color][/li][/list][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][/color][/i][/size][/color][list][li][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][b]Cognitive.[/b] Finally, following the principle of recency (that information presented last also is well retained), crew departure and arrival briefings should conclude with a recap of the critical threats and associated countermeasures, as well as specific PM duties for each particular departure or arrival. Why is this so important? Cognitive psychologist Gary Klein, Ph.D., a leading researcher in recognition-primed decision-making theory, has determined that professions requiring rapid decision making in high workload environments subject to rapidly changing conditions (i.e., fire-fighting, law enforcement, the military and aviation), will involve decisions based on recognition-primed pattern-matching. A pattern-match, according to Klein, is an action that is derived from relevant cues, expectancies and goals. These cues, expectations and goals normally will be a result of insights and expertise gained through specific training or routines, professional study, deliberate practice, or overall experience. In very rare cases such as Capt. Chesley Sullenberger’s “miracle on the Hudson,” (US Airways Flight 1549) experts will seek a pattern-match that is “close enough” because the situation is unfamiliar to them, requiring some level of improvisation. In any case, a successful outcome will require an appropriate pattern-match. For this reason, flight crews should brief in a manner that will serve to prime them with potential pattern-matches. Once these pattern-matches and the cues that should elicit them have been mentally primed, it is a lot more likely that when an abnormal situation arises, the crew will be able to trigger these pattern-match–based responses quickly and accurately.[/font][/color][/i][/size][/color][/li][/list][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][/color][/i][/size][/color][list][li][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][size=15px][i][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][/color][/i][/size][size=26px][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/size][size=26px][font=Roboto Slab]Set-Up and Brief (T-P-C)[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]In order to incorporate these four goals, we came up with a better way for crews to prepare for departures and arrivals. First, they perform a set-up. The set-up is a very specific, deliberate process in which both the PF and PM take time, normally without discussion, to ensure all required and applicable items are ready to go. These include a review of the weather, applicable notices to airmen, set-up of their electronic flight bags, instrument panels, navigational guidance and appropriate crosschecks [e.g., automatically uploaded departure or arrival waypoints in the flight management computer). The reason for a “silent” set-up is that we only want crews actually discussing relevant items that may affect safety. We found no data to support the fact that a verbal crew crosscheck of automatically loaded systems is necessary. Though that might have been important when a system was first introduced, after many years of improvement and proven reliability, a verbal review is no longer needed. Knowing what we now know about the importance of priming and pattern-matching, we are convinced that every word crews speak during a briefing is critical and potentially life-savtocing.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/font][/size][size=26px]
[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]Once both crewmembers are set up, the newly devised “T-P-C” (threats-plan-considerations) briefing begins with the PF asking the PM to review any relevant [i]threats[/i][b] [/b]that might be anticipated. By requiring the PM to begin the discussion in this manner, a level of ownership and interactive engagement is fostered. The PM must take time to prepare an answer to the inevitable question that will start the briefing: What are our threats? The crew will then discuss and decide on countermeasures for each relevant threat identified. We provide our crews with a quick reference card that includes a summary of the briefing format, a tool for conducting debriefs, and a list of common threats as a memory jogger. On complex, high-risk departures and arrivals, the threat portion of the briefing can be the most significant and lengthy component of the overall discussion.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]Next comes the PF’s [i]plan[/i]. There was considerable debate over what should be included in the plan, as we did not want to revert to the long, drawn out list of the required items that we were trying to revise. (This is an exercise each respective airline will have to perform in the process of deciding what guidance to include.) Like briefing threats, however, the plan portion should be relevance-based, and scaled up or scaled down appropriately. If a crew is about to perform its 10th arrival and visual approach in the same sunny conditions to an airport to which they have been flying all month, then the discussion will normally be appropriately scaled down due to high proficiency, familiarity and low risk. If, on the other hand, there exists low familiarity and high risk, then much more detail is required.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]Finally, the [i]considerations[/i] portion of the briefing is intended to be a recap or summary of the discussion. It is particularly important if the briefing has been scaled up due to a combination of high risk and complexity. A review of specific PM duties will serve to prime the PF and PM for action should any relevant threats require the agreed-upon countermeasure(s).[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/size][size=26px][font=Roboto Slab]The Rollout[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]The most frequent questions we are asked are, “How did you get your flight operations leadership to buy off on such a big change to your SOP?” and “How did you go about communicating the change to your pilots?” The answer to the first question is easy: We showed them the voluntary safety data and proposed a solution that was more in line with what crews were actually doing and one that incorporated human factors science. Regarding the second question, we spent considerable effort communicating the need for a change several months in advance. We then developed a robust training module, including video examples and, more importantly, emphasizing the [i]why[/i] behind the change. On the day of the rollout, numerous flight operations leaders were available at each domicile to ensure a smooth transition and answer any lingering questions. Several months after the rollout, we conducted a fleet-wide survey to obtain feedback on how well the change was being incorporated and to learn how it could have been better trained and implemented. The entire process received an 84 percent approval rating.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/font][/size][size=26px][font=Roboto Slab]Autonomy, Mastery and Purpose[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px]It is time to unshackle our line crews from the decades-old required list of briefing items. As Dan Pink said in his [i]New York Times [/i]bestseller[i], Drive — The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us[/i], “Carrots and sticks are so last century. For 21st-century work, we need to upgrade to autonomy, mastery and purpose.” The brief-this-or-else stick places the motivation in the wrong place. We need to allow crews the autonomy to scale and tailor their briefings according to the specific situation at hand, not require a one-size-fits-all solution. We must further encourage crews through revised SOPs to exercise their professional mastery in analyzing risk and crafting management strategies to mitigate relevant threats to the safety of flight and to develop appropriate plans of action based on conditions. The purpose of briefing is also the purpose of a professional pilot: to maximize safety. The Birmingham crew thought they were briefing in the safest possible manner, but despite their compliance with all the rules, it just wasn’t enough. We can and we must do better.[/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(35, 41, 56)][/font][/size][size=26px]
[/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px][i]Capt. Rich Loudon is an instructor evaluator and leads the Human Factors Working Group for Alaska Airlines. richard.loudon@alaskaair.com[/i][/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px][i]Capt. David Moriarty is the author of [/i]Practical Human Factors for Pilots[i] and a member of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Human Factors Group[/i][i].[/i][/size][/font][/color][color=rgb(103, 111, 120)][font=Roboto][/size][size=16px][i]A version of this article was first published in [/i]Aerospace[i], the magazine of the Royal Aeronautical Society.[/i][/size][/font][/color][/li][/list]

[Colonel]

[quote]crew chose to fly a seldom performed, [b]non-precision approach[/b][/quote]

I have said this many times before, and I am sure
to the dismay of the four bars I will say it many
times again:

[size=14pt][b]NO ILS, NO APPROACH[/b][/size]

Do you really need a PhD to tell you to put the
needles in the donuts?

[img]https://i.ytimg.com/vi/0r4yTqDUu7U/hqdefault.jpg[/img]

[quote][b]failure to monitor the aircraft’s altitude during the approach[/b],” was the probable cause of the crash, which killed both crewmembers and destroyed the airplane[/quote]

[Liquid Charlie]

I have maintained this for years that scripted briefings are useless. All are supposed to be trained and have full knowledge of SOP so briefing this is redundant. I was always a believer in briefing what wasn't normal or if you were the "killer" items. I have watched on many occasions where a pilot is doing his briefing, his memorized spiel and no one else is even listening and besides it's repeated so fast no one could understand it anyway - but it's SOP and completed. Useless as tits on a bull.

[John Swallow]

Used to fly with a guy and after we'd briefed the approach, I ask:  "Want to brief the missed approach...?"

He'd respond:  "Not an option".

And on we'd press...    (;>0)

[Colonel]

An oldie ...

[quote]
It happened sometime in 1965, in Germany . I was a copilot, so I knew, everything there was to know about flying, and I was frustrated by pilots like my aircraft commander. He was one of those by-the-numbers types, no class, no imagination, no “feel” for flying. You have to be able to feel an airplane. So what if your altitude is a little off, or the glideslope indicator is off a hair? If it feels okay then it is okay. That’s what I believed.

Every time he let me make an approach, even in VFR conditions, he demanded perfection. Not the slightest deviation was permitted. “If you can’t do it when there is no pressure, you surely can’t do it when the pucker factor increases,” he would say. When he shot an approach, it was as if all the instruments were frozen – perfection, but no class.

Then came that routine flight from the Azores to Germany.  The weather was okay; we had 45,000 pounds of fuel and enough cargo to bring the weight of our C-124 Globemaster up to 180,000 pounds, 5,000 pounds below the max allowable. It would be an easy, routine flight all the way.

Halfway to the European mainland, the weather started getting bad. I kept getting updates by high frequency radio. [b]Our destination, a fighter base, went zero/zero. Our two alternates followed shortly thereafter. All of France was down.[/b] We held for two hours, and the weather got worse. Somewhere I heard a fighter pilot declare an emergency because of minimum fuel. He shot two approaches and saw nothing. On the third try, he flamed out and had to eject

We made a precision radar approach; there was nothing but fuzzy fog at minimums. The sun was setting. Now I started to sweat a little. I turned on the instrument lights. When I looked out to where the wings should be, I couldn’t even see the C-124 navigation lights 85 feet from my eyes. I could barely make out a dull glow from the exhaust stacks of the closest engine, and then only on climb power.

When we reduced power to maximum endurance, that friendly glow faded. The pilot asked the engineer where we stood on fuel. The reply was, “I don’t know— we’re so low that the book says the gauges are unreliable below this point.” The navigator became a little frantic. We didn’t carry parachutes on regular MAC flights, so we couldn’t follow the fighter pilot’s example. We would land or crash with the C-124.

The pilot then asked me [b]which of the two nearby fighter bases had the widest runway[/b]. I looked it up and we declared an emergency as we headed for that field.

The pilot then began his briefing. “This will be for real. [b]No missed approach[/b]. We’ll make an ILS and get precision radar to keep us honest. Copilot, we’ll use half flaps. That’ll put the approach speed a little higher, but the pitch angle will be almost level, requiring less attitude change in the flare.”

Why hadn’t I thought of that? Where was my “feel” and “class” now? The briefing continued, “I’ll lock on the gauges. You get ready to take over and complete the landing if you see the runway – that way there will be less room for trouble with me trying to transition from instruments to visual with only a second or two before touchdown.”

Hey, he’s even going to take advantage of his copilot, I thought. He’s not so stupid, after all. “Until we get the runway, you call off every 100 feet above touchdown; until we get down to 100 feet, use the pressure altimeter. Then switch to the radar altimeter for the last 100 feet, and call off every 25 feet. Keep me honest on the airspeed, also. Engineer, when we touch down, I’ll cut the mixtures with the master control lever, and you cut all of the mags. Are there any questions? Let’s go!”

All of a sudden, this unfeeling, by the numbers robot was making a lot of sense. Maybe he really was a pilot and maybe I had something more to learn about flying. We made a short procedure turn to save gas. Radar helped us to get to the outer marker. Half a mile away, we performed the Before Landing Checklist; gear down, flaps 20 degrees. The course deviation indicator was locked in the middle, with the glide slope indicator beginning its trip down from the top of the case.

When the GSI centered, the pilot called for a small power reduction, lowered the nose of the C-124 slightly, and all of the instruments, except the altimeter, froze.

My Lord, that man had a feel for the C-124! [b]He thought something, and the airplane, all 135,000 pounds of it, did what he thought[/b]. “Five hundred feet,” I called out, “400 feet … 300 feet … 200 feet, MATS minimums … 100 feet, Air Force minimums; I’m switching to the radar altimeter … 75 feet nothing in sight …. 50 feet, still nothing … 25 feet, airspeed 100 knots.”

The nose of the C-124 rotated just a couple of degrees, and the airspeed started down. The pilot then casually said, “Hang on, we’re landing.” “Airspeed 90 knots….10 feet, here we go!” The pilot reached up and cut the mixtures with the master control lever, without taking his eyes off the instruments. He told the engineer to cut all the mags to reduce the chance of fire.

CONTACT! I could barely feel it. As smooth a landing as I have ever known, and I couldn’t even tell if we were on the runway, because we could only see the occasional blur of a light streaking by. “Copilot, verify hydraulic boost is on, I’ll need it for brakes and steering.” I complied. “Hydraulic boost pump is on, pressure is up.” The brakes came on slowly—we didn’t want to skid this big beast now. I looked over at the pilot. He was still on the instruments, steering to keep the course deviation indicator in the center, and that is exactly where it stayed.

“Airspeed, 50 knots.” We might make it yet. “Airspeed, 25 knots.” We’ll make it if we don’t run off a cliff. Then I heard a strange sound. I could hear the whir of the gyros, the buzz of the inverters, and a low frequency thumping. Nothing else. The thumping was my pulse, and I couldn’t hear anyone breathing. We had made it! We were standing still!

The aircraft commander was still all pilot. “After-landing checklist, get all those motors, radar and un-necessary radios off while we still have batteries. Copilot, tell them that we have arrived, to send a follow me truck out to the runway because we can’t even see the edges.” I left the VHF on and thanked GCA for the approach.

The guys in the tower didn’t believe we were there. They had walked outside and couldn’t hear or see anything. We assured them that we were there, somewhere on the localizer centerline, with about half a mile showing on the DME. We waited about 20 minutes for the truck. Not being in our customary hurry, just getting our breath back and letting our pulses diminish to a reasonable rate.

Then I felt it. The cockpit shuddered as if the C-124 nose gear had run over a bump. I told the loadmaster to go out the crew entrance to see what happened. He dropped the door (which is immediately in front of the nose gear), and it hit something with a loud, metallic bang. He came on the interphone and said “Sir, you’ll never believe this. The follow-me truck couldn’t see us and ran smack into our nose tire with his bumper, but he bounced off, and nothing is hurt.”

The pilot then told the tower that we were parking the bird right where it was and that we would come in via the truck. It took a few minutes to get our clothing and to button up the C-124. I climbed out and saw the nose tires straddling the runway centerline. A few feet away was the truck with its embarrassed driver.

Total damage—one dent in the hood of the follow me truck where the hatch had opened onto it. Then I remembered the story from Fate Is the Hunter. When Gann was an airline copilot making a simple night range approach, his captain kept lighting matches in front of his eyes. It scarred and infuriated Gann. When they landed, the captain said that Gann was ready to upgrade to captain. If he could handle a night-range approach with all of that harassment, then he could handle anything.

At last I understood what true professionalism is. Being a pilot isn’t all seat-of-the-pants flying and glory. It’s self- discipline, practice, study, analysis and preparation. It’s precision. If you can’t keep the gauges where you want them with everything free and easy, how can you keep them there when everything goes wrong?[/quote]

[b][size=2em]Needles in the fucking donuts, four bars.[/size][/b]

[img width=500 height=275]http://christinenegroni.com/wp-content/ ... 24x565.jpg[/img]

[img width=500 height=281]https://i.cbc.ca/1.3014702.1495118278!/ ... ngines.jpg[/img]

[img width=500 height=281]https://i.ytimg.com/vi/TZTezfmeGmU/maxresdefault.jpg[/img]

[img width=500 height=345]https://i.cbc.ca/1.4199192.1500301867!/ ... co-fix.jpg[/img]


Look down at your shoulder.  If you see gold bars:
[b][size=2em]No ILS, No Approach[/size][/b]

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Being able to land in zero zero conditions can save your life.




I  trained myself to land zero zero and also taught zero zero landings.


For me it was a skill well learned because twice during my career I was forced to land zero zero.

[JW Scud]

[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=7206.msg19594#msg19594 date=1507097382]
Needles in the fucking donuts, four bars.

Look down at your shoulder.  If you see gold bars:
[b][size=2em]No ILS, No Approach[/size][/b]
[/quote]

And do your damn jobs incompetent engineers,

Another massive loss of life due to the engineers. Look down at your finger. If you see one of those silly rings: Then design a friggin' widebody jet that doesn't go into uncommanded reverse.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lauda_Air_Flight_004

More four bars(and hundreds of passengers) killed by engineers. At least the four bars is there to experience the disaster he creates, unlike the engineers who are off playing with their toys and telling us how smart they are.

[Colonel]

Since you chose not to respond on the given topic,
apparently you do not disagree with my conclusion.


Needles in the donuts, ok four bars?

[JW Scud]

[quote author=Colonel Sanders link=topic=7206.msg19612#msg19612 date=1507156405]
Since you chose not to respond on the given topic,
apparently you do not disagree with my conclusion.


Needles in the donuts, ok four bars?
[/quote]

Since you didn't respond to what I posted about aircraft design, apparently you do not disagree with my conclusion.

Stop killing passengers with faulty designs, OK engineers?

[Colonel]

You need a new line of work that suits you more, where
you don't have to use technology that confuses you,
any more.

Caveman.

If you can't make yourself happy, though, try to
keep the needles in the donuts and try not to land
on the taxiway.