AirAsia SNAFU
Posted: Thu Sep 08, 2016 2:00 am
Incidents like this are a tad concerning....
[url=http://avherald.com/h?article=482f868f&opt=0]http://avherald.com/h?article=482f868f&opt=0[/url]
[font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The ATSB reported that during flight preparation the captain (ATPL, 22,580 total hours) manually copied the gate coordinates of S33°56.77' E151°09.8', visible on a sign at the gate, into the flight management and guidance system (FMGS), however mistype as S33°56.77' E015°19.8' effective putting the aircraft's systems 161nm west of Cape Town (South Africa) into the Atlantic Ocean more than 11,000km from the actual position at the gate in Sydney.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px] [/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The captain subsequently aligned all three Inertial Reference Systems (IRS), parts of the Air Data and Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU), to this position without detecting the typo and confirmed the ALIGN IRS message. The captain subsequently checked the FMGS' progress page showing the GPS as primary source for navigation and position accuracy being high. The captain completed the route programming.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]When the first officer (ATPL, 2,200 hours total) returned from the walk around, he checked the flight plan and the progress page and too was satisfied, that the FMGS had been programmed correctly without detecting the typo.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]During engine start both crew heard a single chime, however no related ECAM or STATUS message was displayed. Neither crew looked at the overhead panel or MCDU and continued with the departure preparations.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]Two more chimes were heard when the aircraft was about to line up runway 16R, again there was no ECAM or STATUS message, hence the crew continued line up. The first officer assumed controls for the departure. Immediately after the aircraft rotated, the EGWS sounded "TERRAIN! TERRAIN!" alerts, the crew anticipated a "PULL UP!" alert, however, this did not occur and the crew believed the EGPWS alert had been spurious. The aircraft was in visual meteorological conditions, it was clearly visible there was no conflict with terrain, hence the captain instructed the first officer to disregard the terrain warning.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]When the aircraft climbed through 410 feet AGL the autopilot was engaged, the aircraft turned on a heading of 132 degrees with a heading display of 170 degrees in the cockpit. A few seconds later ATC observed the aircraft turning into the departure path of the parallel runway 16L and held a departure ready on runway 16L. [/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]After the captain had identified the EGPWS warning as spurious the pilots noticed the Navigation Displays did not show any of the expected waypoints, a GPS PRIMARY LOST message appeared. The captain checked with ATC their track, which was about 130 degrees, ATC instructed the crew to turn onto a heading of 220 degrees on their primary display and once the aircraft was on that heading instructed the crew to report their heading displayed on the stand by instruments, which was 180 degrees at that point. The controller verified that the 180 degrees matched his radar display.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The crew attempted to restore their navigation intending to continue the flight to Kuala Lumpur. The captain assumed the role as pilot flying while the first officer attempted to identify the related checklists and work them. In the absence of any STATUS or ECAM message the first officer initially referenced the unreliable airspeed indication checklist, similiar to a training he had recently received, and developed a mindset of the Air Data Reference (ADR) being unreliable.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]While working through the various possible checklists the first officer advised the captain that he would switch each of the ADIRUs from NAV to OFF and back in sequence, which would likely disconnect the autopilot, the captain responded "yes". Being interrupted by an ATC communication the first officer subsequently switched off ADIRU1 and ADIRU3 which caused the FBW to drop to alternate law, the autopilot disconnected and several navigation systems degraded. The captain instructed the first officer to stop actioning switches, ADIRU2 remained in the NAV position.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The captain's primary flight display had lost all information except accurate airspeed and vertical speed, the first officer's primary flight display showed airspeed, vertical speed, attitude and an erroneous heading information (the erroneous heading was also shown on the first officer's ND). No map display was available, neither autopilot nor autothrust could be engaged.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The integrated standby instrument system continued to provide attitude and air data from its own independent accelerometers, gyrometers and air data sources (pitot systems).[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]In view of the degraded navigational performance the captain advised ATC that they would discontinue the flight and return to Sydney, with both captain's and first officer's ND being unusable the captain advised they could only perform a visual approach. Weather conditions in Sydney had deteriorated with a cloud base at 1700 feet and rain showers not permitting a visual approach. ATC established that the weather conditions at Melbourne permitted a visual approach and coordinated with all controllers that they would provide continuous radar vectors to the aircraft to reach Melbourne.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]During the first visual approach to Melbourne the crew noticed they were becoming too high and too fast and went around, almost at the same time the EGPWS again issued a spurious warning. The aircraft positioned for a second approach and landed without further incident.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The ATSB reported that following landing extensive tests of the aircraft systems were conducted including swapping around ADIRUs and powering down the entire FMGS, however, no faults were found.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]
After almost 3 hours on the ground the same flight and cabin crew departed Melbourne and performed an uneventful flight to Kuala Lumpur.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][quote][font=Times][/font][/quote]
[url=http://avherald.com/h?article=482f868f&opt=0]http://avherald.com/h?article=482f868f&opt=0[/url]
[font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The ATSB reported that during flight preparation the captain (ATPL, 22,580 total hours) manually copied the gate coordinates of S33°56.77' E151°09.8', visible on a sign at the gate, into the flight management and guidance system (FMGS), however mistype as S33°56.77' E015°19.8' effective putting the aircraft's systems 161nm west of Cape Town (South Africa) into the Atlantic Ocean more than 11,000km from the actual position at the gate in Sydney.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px] [/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The captain subsequently aligned all three Inertial Reference Systems (IRS), parts of the Air Data and Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU), to this position without detecting the typo and confirmed the ALIGN IRS message. The captain subsequently checked the FMGS' progress page showing the GPS as primary source for navigation and position accuracy being high. The captain completed the route programming.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]When the first officer (ATPL, 2,200 hours total) returned from the walk around, he checked the flight plan and the progress page and too was satisfied, that the FMGS had been programmed correctly without detecting the typo.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]During engine start both crew heard a single chime, however no related ECAM or STATUS message was displayed. Neither crew looked at the overhead panel or MCDU and continued with the departure preparations.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]Two more chimes were heard when the aircraft was about to line up runway 16R, again there was no ECAM or STATUS message, hence the crew continued line up. The first officer assumed controls for the departure. Immediately after the aircraft rotated, the EGWS sounded "TERRAIN! TERRAIN!" alerts, the crew anticipated a "PULL UP!" alert, however, this did not occur and the crew believed the EGPWS alert had been spurious. The aircraft was in visual meteorological conditions, it was clearly visible there was no conflict with terrain, hence the captain instructed the first officer to disregard the terrain warning.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]When the aircraft climbed through 410 feet AGL the autopilot was engaged, the aircraft turned on a heading of 132 degrees with a heading display of 170 degrees in the cockpit. A few seconds later ATC observed the aircraft turning into the departure path of the parallel runway 16L and held a departure ready on runway 16L. [/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]After the captain had identified the EGPWS warning as spurious the pilots noticed the Navigation Displays did not show any of the expected waypoints, a GPS PRIMARY LOST message appeared. The captain checked with ATC their track, which was about 130 degrees, ATC instructed the crew to turn onto a heading of 220 degrees on their primary display and once the aircraft was on that heading instructed the crew to report their heading displayed on the stand by instruments, which was 180 degrees at that point. The controller verified that the 180 degrees matched his radar display.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The crew attempted to restore their navigation intending to continue the flight to Kuala Lumpur. The captain assumed the role as pilot flying while the first officer attempted to identify the related checklists and work them. In the absence of any STATUS or ECAM message the first officer initially referenced the unreliable airspeed indication checklist, similiar to a training he had recently received, and developed a mindset of the Air Data Reference (ADR) being unreliable.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]While working through the various possible checklists the first officer advised the captain that he would switch each of the ADIRUs from NAV to OFF and back in sequence, which would likely disconnect the autopilot, the captain responded "yes". Being interrupted by an ATC communication the first officer subsequently switched off ADIRU1 and ADIRU3 which caused the FBW to drop to alternate law, the autopilot disconnected and several navigation systems degraded. The captain instructed the first officer to stop actioning switches, ADIRU2 remained in the NAV position.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The captain's primary flight display had lost all information except accurate airspeed and vertical speed, the first officer's primary flight display showed airspeed, vertical speed, attitude and an erroneous heading information (the erroneous heading was also shown on the first officer's ND). No map display was available, neither autopilot nor autothrust could be engaged.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The integrated standby instrument system continued to provide attitude and air data from its own independent accelerometers, gyrometers and air data sources (pitot systems).[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]In view of the degraded navigational performance the captain advised ATC that they would discontinue the flight and return to Sydney, with both captain's and first officer's ND being unusable the captain advised they could only perform a visual approach. Weather conditions in Sydney had deteriorated with a cloud base at 1700 feet and rain showers not permitting a visual approach. ATC established that the weather conditions at Melbourne permitted a visual approach and coordinated with all controllers that they would provide continuous radar vectors to the aircraft to reach Melbourne.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]During the first visual approach to Melbourne the crew noticed they were becoming too high and too fast and went around, almost at the same time the EGPWS again issued a spurious warning. The aircraft positioned for a second approach and landed without further incident.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]The ATSB reported that following landing extensive tests of the aircraft systems were conducted including swapping around ADIRUs and powering down the entire FMGS, however, no faults were found.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][center][font=Times][size=16px]
After almost 3 hours on the ground the same flight and cabin crew departed Melbourne and performed an uneventful flight to Kuala Lumpur.[/size][/font][/center][font=Times][/font][quote][font=Times][/font][/quote]